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STATEMENT QF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR APPEAL 
1 . Whether impoundment of d e f e n d a n t s truck was 
reasonable or necessary where defendant offered to assume 
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y for h i s property and the truck was lawful ly parked 
on private property and where the s o l e j u s t i f i c a t i o n for 
impoundment was the o f f i c e r ' s concern for the safety of 
defendant's truck and i t s contents . 
2 . Whether the inventory search was a pretext for a 
f u l l inves t iga tory search. 
- i i i -
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
-v-
ALLEN F. RICE, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
Case No. 20651 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT QF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged with Possession of A Controlled 
Substancef a misdemeanor, and Possession of A Controlled 
Substance with Intent to Distribute for Valuef a felony, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8 (Supp. 1985) , and Driving 
on Suspension/ a misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. 
§41-12-32 (1981). 
Defendant was convicted of all three chargesf in a jury 
trial held April 16-19f 1985, in the First Judicial District 
Court, in and for Cache Countyf State of Utahf the Honorable 
VeNoy Christopherson, presiding. Judge Christopherson sentenced 
defendant on May 6, 1985 to an indeterminate term of not more 
than fifteen years in the Utah State Prison for the felony 
convictionf 3 0 days in jail for the misdemeanor possession of a 
controlled substance conviction, and ordered him to pay a $150 
fine for driving while suspended. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Detec t ives in the Cache County S h e r i f f 1 s Office had 
been i n v e s t i g a t i n g defendant for some time prior to December 7, 
1984 because they suspected him of deal ing drugs (T.S. 3 , 6 , 15 , 
4 1 , 6 8 , 7 6 ) . * On December 7 , 1984, Sergeant Groll and Detect ive 
Bla ir were driving through Logan, Utah on t h e i r way to conduct 
s u r v e i l l a n c e in Providence (T.S. 31-32 , 69) . They drove past 
d e f e n d a n t s parent ' s home and looked to see i f he was there but 
did not see the truck they knew defendant drove (T.S. 6 -7 , 8 , 69-
7 0 ) . The o f f i c e r s expected they might see defendant's truck a t 
h i s parent ' s house because they knew he regularly came there on 
Wednesday n ights from h i s home in S a l t Lake City (T.S. 6 , 19 , 22 , 
53-54, 6 9 ) . They also knew defendant probably could not l e g a l l y 
drive because h i s d r i v e r ' s l i c e n s e was suspended for f a i l u r e to 
prove f inanc ia l r e s p o n s i b i l i t y when they checked i t on the 
computer a few weeks before (T.S. 10 , 32 , 66 , 82 ) . 
Groll and Blair stopped to buy a soda pop at a gas 
s t a t i o n near defendant's parent ' s home (T.S. 1 3 , 6 9 ) . They were 
in the ir parked car drinking the pop when they saw defendant's 
truck drive by and decided t o stop him because they suspected h i s 
d r i v e r ' s l i c e n s e remained suspended (T.S. 1 1 , 13-14) . The 
d e t e c t i v e s s ignaled defendant to pul l over with a red l i g h t 
attached t o the ir unmarked car (T.S. 14 , 41) . Defendant drove 
in to a parking l o t , stopped, got out of h i s truck and c losed the 
door (T.S. 14-15 , 48 , 50 , 51) . This parking l o t was located 
1
 The transcr ipt of t r i a l i s referenced as "T."; the transcr ipt 
of the hearing on the motion to suppress i s referenced as "T.S."• 
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behind a law office, off of Third South, just east of Main Street 
(T.S. 64). It was bounded on two sides by a motel and on one 
side by the law office (T.S 64). The remaining side was open to 
Third South (T.S. 64) . 
After confirming through radio contact that defendants 
license was suspended, the officers arrested defendant (T.S. 21, 
52). Defendant asked if he could lock his truck and leave it 
there, but Groll said that was not one of the choices (T.S. 30, 
56). Defendant also asked to take the truck four blocks to his 
parent's home, but Groll denied this request (T.S. 23, 31, 56). 
Groll told defendant he had two choices; a wrecker would come to 
impound it or Groll could drive it to the Sheriff1s Office (T.S. 
31, 56). Both of these options result in an inventory search 
(T.S. 80). Defendant then chose to have Groll drive it to the 
station (T.S. 25, 57). At that point, defendant requested to be 
allowed to move luggage that was in the open truck bed into the 
cab and Groll drove the truck with defendant and Blair following 
in the detectives1 car approximately five blocks to the station 
(T.S. 25, 43, 57, 65). If defendant had sufficient money to post 
bail, he could probably have been booked and released within 
fifteen to twenty minutes (T.S. 61-62). Or, if he called 
someone, and the money was immediately available, he could have 
been released within forty-five minutes (T.S. 62). 
At the station, Groll parked the truck in the parking 
lot, locked it, and left it there for five to ten minutes (T.S. 
58-59). Groll then went back out and drove the truck into the 
garage of the police station (T.S. 59-60). He relocked it and 
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l e f t for a couple of minutes (T.S. 6 0 ) . Groll obtained 
appropriate inventory forms and inventoried the contents of the 
truck (T.S. 27-29 , 82-84, 86-87, T. 111 ) . During the search, 
Groll and Bla ir found cocaine, marijuana and various personal 
items (T.S. 87, T. 112) . 
Groll and Bla ir t e s t i f i e d that they had discussed three 
p o s s i b i l i t i e s before December 7 for deal ing with defendant (R.S. 
6 6 - 6 8 ) . They d iscussed: arranging a contro l l ed drug buyf 
seeking a search warrant from a magis trate , or stopping defendant 
for driving while suspended (T.S. 18 f 6 6 - 6 8 ) . Both men hoped 
that the confrontation on the t r a f f i c stop would turn up drugs 
(T.S. 29-30 r 80) , or at l e a s t f e l t i t was a p o s s i b i l i t y (T.S. 18 , 
7 1 , 80-81) . There was not probable cause to obtain a warrant and 
they had not been able to arrange a buy up t o that time (T.S. 77-
78) . 
Groll t e s t i f i e d that he f e l t the impounding of 
defendant's car and the inventory were necessary to protect the 
o f f i c e r s from poss ib l e l a t e r the f t claims and to protect 
defendant's property (T.S. 64 f 85 f 88) . He also claimed, 
however, that defendant did not ask him to move anything from the 
back of the truck u n t i l after defendant decided to l e t Groll 
drive the truck t o the s h e r i f f ' s o f f i c e (T.S. 5 7 ) . Once Groll 
got in to the truck cab, he saw other items including books, a 
houseplant and what looked l i k e a camera case (T.S. 65-66 , 81 ) . 
I t was 8:00-8:30 p.m. and the sun had set (T.S. 45 , 4 9 ) . He said 
that the motel bordering two s ides of the l o t was not reputable 
s t a t i n g : 
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not knowing the individuals that may be living 
theref have had in the past some problems 
with criminal activityf people living in that 
motel. 
(T.S. 64). There were no other cars parked in the lot at the 
time (T.S. 64). There was lighting in the area from a service 
station and on Main Street (T.S. 50). 
There was no written policy on impoundments or 
inventory searches within the department that Groll was aware of 
(T.S. 92). Groll was told when he asked other officers after 
driving the truck to the station that it was within his 
discretion whether he should impound a vehicle and inventory its 
contents (T.S. 92). Some of the officers impound vehicles in 
similar situations and others do not (T.S. 92-93). 
Defendant filed a motion to suppress the evidence 
discovered during the inventory and a hearing was held on July 
23f 1984. The motion was denied (R. 110-114). At trialf 
defendant renewed his motion to suppress (R. 4) and objected to 
admission of the evidence (T. 337). 
SUMMARY QF ARGUMENT 
The impoundment of defendant's vehicle was not 
supported by statutory authority nor by the circumstances of the 
stop where there were reasonable alternatives to impoundment. 
The lower court, therefore, should have suppressed the evidence 
discovered in the subsequent inventory search. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE IMPOUNDMENT OF DEFENDANTS VEHICLE 
WAS APPARENTLY UNNECESSARY UNDER THE 
CIRCUMSTANCES OF THIS CASE. 
This Court recent ly decided State v. Hygh» 16 Utah Adv. 
Rep. 10 (Aug. 16, 1985) , in which an impoundment and inventory 
search of a car was found unconst i tut ional because i t was 
pretextual for a fu l l -b lown inves t iga tory search. The Court did 
not ru le out inventory searches but said t h a t : 
[a] warrant less search of an impounded v e h i c l e 
for the purposes of protect ing the po l i ce and 
publ ic from dangerf avoiding p o l i c e l i a b i l i t y 
for l o s t or s t o l e n property, and protect ing the 
owner's property i s permitted . . . 
16 Utah Adv. Rep. at 1 1 . Before reaching the quest ion of the 
v a l i d i t y of the inventory search, however, "the court must f i r s t 
determine whether there was reasonable and proper j u s t i f i c a t i o n 
for the impoundment," Xd* at 12, e i ther through s tatutory 
authorizat ion or by the circumstances surrounding the i n i t i a l 
s top . 2d. The search i s unreasonable where impoundment was 
nei ther authorized nor necessary. I d . 
In support of i t s dec i s ion in Hygh, t h i s Court c i t e d 
State v . Goodrich, 256 N.W.2d 506 (Minn. 1977) . Goodrich held 
that an impoundment was unnecessary to protect the arrested 
i n d i v i d u a l ' s property and the po l i ce from claims ar i s ing from 
the f t because the arres tee had assumed r e s p o n s i b i l i t y for h i s own 
property. 256 N.W.2d at 511 . The S t a t e , therefore , had not 
demonstrated that "impoundment was a reasonable means of 
furthering a reasonable s t a t e purpose." Id- There i s a growing 
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body of case law holding t h a t when an a r r e s t ee spec i f i ca l ly 
requests t ha t h i s vehicle be lawfully parked a t the scene or 
turned over to a f r iend, the police must honor the request . jS££f 
I I LaFave, Search and Seizure, § 7 .3 , p . 557 and cases c i ted a t 
n. 62. Some cases go so far as to place a duty on police 
o f f ice rs to take the i n i t i a t i v e in arranging or suggesting 
a l t e r n a t i v e s to impoundment. Xd. at 557-558. Although there are 
cases which r e j ec t t h i s pos i t ion , JS££ Xd. a t 558-559, t h i s Court 
has apparently elected to follow the cases which embrace i t . See 
e.flt S ta te v. Hygh, 16 Utah Adv. Rep. 10, 12 (Aug. 16, 1985). 
None of the s ta tu tory author izat ions for impoundment 
out l ined in Utah Code Ann. §§ 41-1-115, 41-6-116.10 or 58-37-13 
(1953, as amended)2 existed in the case a t bar a t the time of 
the s top. Thus, the impoundment of the defendant 's truck must 
stand or f a l l on the circumstances surrounding the s top, Hygh, 16 
Dtah Adv. Rep. a t 12. 
In Hygh, t h i s Court looked to the wr i t ten Sa l t Lake 
City impound procedure to determine whether the impound and sub-
sequent search were reasonable. Cache County does not have 
wr i t ten procedures concerning impounds, according to Sgt. Groll 
(T.S. 92) . The Sa l t Lake City standards are i n s t ruc t ive on what 
impounds are authorized or necessary. Those standards provide 
tha t the off icer should allow an a r r e s t ee to arrange for d ispos i -
t ion of h i s vehic le if poss ib le . H^gh, 16 Utah Adv. Rep. a t 12. 
2 They a re : the vehicle was used to t ranspor t control led 
substances (the of f icers had no reason to believe tha t drugs 
would be found in the t ruck ) ; the vehicle was improperly 
reg i s te red or s to len ; the vehicle was abandoned. 
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An individual who i s taken in to custody 
ought not to have h i s v e h i c l e impounded/ 
inventoried and towed away under such 
circumstances where a l t erna t ive s teps can 
be taken t o secure the v e h i c l e And the 
individual i s w i l l i n g to accept the 
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y for the safekeeping of 
the contents of such v e h i c l e . 
State v . Jenkins, 319 So.2d 9 1 , 94-95 (Fla. App. 1975) . £££ alJSG 
Schwasta v. United S t a t e s , 392 A.2d 1071, 1074-75 (D.C. App. 
1978) . 
While the o f f i c e r a r t i c u l a t e d and the t r i a l court found 
(R. 110) that he was afraid to leave defendant's truck in the 
l oca t ion where defendant parked i t , and although t h i s i s 
c e r t a i n l y a l e g i t i m a t e concern, SL££ South Dakota v. Qpperman, 
428 U.S. 364 (1976) , defendant was w i l l i n g to take that r i sk . 
In l i g h t of defendant's w i l l i n g n e s s to take the risk in t h i s 
case , there i s no reasonable S t a t e ' s i n t e r e s t that overrides 
defendant's right to be free from unreasonable searches and 
s e i z u r e s . Defendant was not allowed to make any attempt to 
arrange a l t e r n a t i v e d i s p o s i t i o n of h i s truck but was t o l d that 
was not one of h i s cho ices . The o f f i c e r ' s dec i s ion t o impound 
the truck was made before defendant asked him to move a r t i c l e s 
from the open truck bed to the cab and before the o f f i c e r saw 
what was in the truck cab. His dec i s ion was not based on the 
fact that va luables were ins ide the truck. The o f f i c e r did not 
ask whether there were valuables in the truck. Had there been a 
d i scuss ion about va luables , the o f f i c e r would have been j u s t i f i e d 
in determining not to l eave the truck in an area of quest ionable 
s a f e t y . 
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Nor was i t c lear that there wasf in f a c t f a risk 
involved in l eav ing the car parked in that l o c a t i o n . While i t 
was dark outsider the o f f i c e r could not r e c a l l at the Hearing the 
l i g h t i n g s i t u a t i o n in the parking l o t . Moreover the o f f i c e r 1 s 
assumptions about the nearby mote l ' s reputation were based on 
speculat ion that persons who had been involved in undefined 
criminal a c t i v i t y in the past might have been l i v i n g in the motel 
rather than upon knowledge that t h i s was the case . The o f f i c e r 
gave no ind ica t ion that the "criminal a c t i v i t y " was re la ted to 
the safety of parked v e h i c l e s . The o f f i c e r 1 s speculat ion f a l l s 
short of carrying the S t a t e ' s burden of showing the n e c e s s i t y of 
impoundment under the circumstances. 
Further f there i s no evidence that the property owner 
was unwil l ing to allow defendant's truck to remain in the parking 
l o t . Several courts have held that a v e h i c l e parked on private 
property should not be impounded unless the property owner 
requests removal or there are other circumstances making 
impoundment reasonable such as r the v e h i c l e was crashed into 
s tructures on the property or f presumably, the property was 
posted with s igns prohibi t ing such parking. &££, II LaFavef 
Search and S e i z u r e . § 7 . 3 , p. 555 n. 5 7 f and S&& Supp. 1986 at p. 
264-265 n. 49r 5 5 . l r 56 r 57. 
A further j u s t i f i c a t i o n for impounding defendant's 
truck might have been that i t would be l e f t unattended for an 
extended period of time. Sgt. Groll t e s t i f i e d , howeverf that 
defendant could have been re leased within a r e l a t i v e l y short 
time f 15-20 minutes i f he had money to post bai l or 45 minutes i f 
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someone brought him the money. £&& Schwasta. 3 92 A.2d at 107 5; 
and -see United States v. Sta l led 616 F.2d 1284 (5th c ir . 1980). 
The record a l so i n d i c a t e s that d e f e n d a n t s parents l i v e d in 
Loganf four and one-half blocks from the scene of a r r e s t , that 
the o f f i c e r s knew t h i s , and there was no evidence defendant could 
not have arranged for them to take custody of the truck within a 
short period of time. 
Certa inly , d e f e n d a n t s suggest ion that he be allowed to 
take the truck to h i s mother1 s house was not a v i a b l e 
a l t e r n a t i v e . Driving the truck would have been a further 
v i o l a t i o n of the law by defendant and the o f f i c e r s cannot be 
expected to condone such a c t i v i t y . The fact remains, however, 
that t h i s was not the only a l t e r n a t i v e and that there were 
reasonable a l t e r n a t i v e s that could have been arranged without 
lengthy delay or unreasonable burden to the o f f i c e r s . Po l i ce 
o f f i c e r s , of course, should not be expected t o go to extreme 
l engths to avoid impoundment of a v e h i c l e and where no 
reasonable, convenient a l t e r n a t i v e s t o impoundment e x i s t , they 
should be allowed t o impound the v e h i c l e . 
Defendant suggested one a l t e r n a t i v e to impoundment in 
t h i s case that was reasonable and e a s i l y accomplished. That was, 
simply, to lock the truck and leave i t parked. While there are 
circumstances in which t h i s would not have been acceptable , such 
as where the t ruck ' s l o c a t i o n would have been hazardous t o the 
p u b l i c , jsfifi United S t a t e s v. G r i f f i n , 729 F.2d 475, 480 (7th Cir. 
1984) (1982 Corvette i l l e g a l l y parked at s ide of t o l l road l a t e 
at night hazard to passing m o t o r i s t s ) , or was known to be unsafe 
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for parked vehicles, JBSL£ Staller. 616 F.2d at 1290 (car parked 
overnight in mall parking lot runs appreciable risk of vandalism 
or thef t) , there was no evidence of a hazard to the public and 
only an implication of unspecified prior criminal activity in the 
area. 
Like the officer in Eysh, the officers did not ask 
defendant if anything of value was in the vehicle. They did not 
allow him to arrange for disposition of his own property. The 
truck was parked in a parking lot in an apparently lawful parking 
area. While, unlike fl^gh, there were personal items visible in 
the truck, these were not brought to the officers1 attention 
until after the decision to impound was made. The truck could 
have been locked and left unattended. No evidence was presented 
that there was a danger to police or to the public. 
Because the burden is on the State to establish the 
necessity for the taking and the inventory of the vehicle and 
there was no reasonable State interest in impounding defendant's 
truck in this case, it was error for the lower court to refuse to 
suppress the evidence discovered in the inventory search. 
Admittedly, the officers also testified at the hearing 
that they had discussed the possibility of stopping defendant if 
they saw him driving to arrest him for driving while suspended. 
The context of this conversation apparently was a discussion of 
alternative ways to further their drug investigation. Both 
officers admitted they hoped, or at least knew it was a 
possibility, that they would find drugs in defendant's possession 
in such a situation. And, while the officers apparently followed 
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unwritten departmental policy on inventory searches and did list 
the items in the truck on a standardized form, there was 
effectively no policy on the propriety of impoundment, that 
decision being left to the individual officer's discretion. 
These facts, taken together, suggest the possibility that the 
impoundment and subsequent inventory search were pretextual for a 
full-blown investigative search. As this Court noted in H^gh: 
Iwlhat is needed in the vehicle inventory 
context . . . is . . . a regularized set of 
procedures which adequately guard against 
arbitrariness. 
16 Utah Adv. Rep. at 13, footnote omitted. Without some 
guidelines for making a decision to impound, officers may too 
easily exercise their discretion to the point of arbitrariness. 
Defendant, on the other hand, urges that any time an 
officer possesses knowledge of possible criminal activity other 
than that for which he was arrested, a subsequent inventory 
search is always invalid. The State does not agree with such a 
position. Had impoundment been necessary or authorized in this 
case, it would have been irrelevant that the officers suspected 
defendant dealt in illicit drugs or that they had discussed the 
possibility of a traffic arrest uncovering evidence of drugs. It 
would even have been irrelevant that there were no written 
procedures so long as impoundment was authorized or necessary. 
When officers have legally obtained custody of a vehicle, and 
follow standard procedures for the search, an inventory of the 
vehicle's contents aimed at securing or protecting the vehicle 
and its contents and at protecting the police from liability, is 
constitutional. Opperman. 428 U.S. at 373; Griffin, 729 F.2d at 
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481• " [ I ] f an inventory search i s otherwise reasonable, i t s 
v a l i d i t y i s not v i t i a t e d by a p o l i c e o f f i c e r ' s suspic ion that 
contraband or other evidence may be found." S t a l l e r . 616 P.2d at 
1290, quoting United S ta te s v> Presco t t , 599 P.2d 103, 106 (5th 
Cir. 1979) • j£fi£ slSQ. Jenkins, 319 So.2d at 94. 
CONCLUSION 
Because of the nature of the S t a t e 1 s response in Point 
I of t h i s br ie f , i t i s unnecessary to respond to the second point 
raised by defendant on appeal because a f inding that suppression 
of the evidence would have been proper obviates the need for 
arguing i t s su f f i c i ency to e s t a b l i s h intent to d i s t r i b u t e . 
Reversal of defendant's convic t ions of possess ion of contro l l ed 
substances has no e f f e c t on h i s convict ion of driving while 
suspended and the State requests affirmance of that convict ion . 
DATED this day of March, 1986. 
DAVID L. WILKINSON 
Attorney General 
?3m&t x 
o^SANDRA L. 
Assistant Attorney General 
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